†a) , Nonmember and Ilsun YOU † †b) , Member SUMMARY This paper presents an efficient subverted symmetric encryption scheme, which outputs a random initialization vector (IV). Compared with the available scheme of the same kind in the literature, our attack provides a saboteur (big brother) with much faster recovery of a key used in a victim's symmetric encryption scheme. Our result implies that care must be taken when a symmetric encryption scheme with a random IV such as randomized CBC is deployed.
Introduction
Motivation. Since Edward Snowden revealed that the US and UK governments made a great deal of effort to subvert widely deployed cryptographic systems [4] , algorithm substitution attack (ASA) [1] on cryptographic schemes has been being actively explored [2] , [3] , [5] . ASA, proposed by Bellare, Paterson and Rogaway (BPR), refers to an activity whereby a saboteur [5] (or a big brother [1] , [6] ) replaces an original implementation of a cryptographic scheme with a subverted one. This subverted scheme can leak partial or entire information about the secret key or message.
Note that the notion of ASA is very similar to that of "kleptographic" attack in the early literature [6] . Note also that Degabriele, Farshim and Poettering recently refined and improved BPR's security notions related to ASA [3] .
In this paper, we focus on BPR's IV-replacement attack whereby a random IV, which is present as a ciphertext component of a symmetric encryption scheme such as randomized CBC, is replaced by a concocted IV that will make it possible for a saboteur to recover the key used in the symmetric encryption scheme. More precisely, the saboteur replaces the victim's symmetric encryption algorithm with a malicious one that outputs a ciphertext to encrypt the victim's secret key under his subversion key using a symmetric encryption scheme of his choice. This ciphertext is disguised as a random IV of the victim's symmetric encryption scheme. By decrypting the ciphertext disguised as the random IV with his subversion key, the saboteur will be able to obtain the victim's secret key and be in full control of the cryptosystem. However, there are some technical difficulties in realizing IV-replacement attack, which were not addressed fully in BPR's work [1] . That is, the saboteur needs to maintain a state, which is to "remember" one particular subverted ciphertext that contains disguised IV that encrypts the victim's symmetric key. Since maintaining such a state (remembering one ciphertext among many) is not always practical, if not impossible. BPR also proposed the "stateless" subverted scheme in which the saboteur does not need to maintain a state. However, the problem of this approach is that the saboteur needs to collect more than 896 ciphertexts (if 128-bit key is used) to recover the victim's key. Our aim is to revisit BPR's subverted symmetric encryption scheme and improve its efficiency. Our Contributions. We show that the aforementioned IVreplacement attack can be performed very efficiently, more efficiently than those presented in BPR's paper [1] . The idea behind our improvement is that we propose a "semistateful" subversion technique that every one of two consecutive ciphertexts contains subliminal information that can lead to the leakage of a victim's key. Basically, our attack is stateful but in our improved attack, the saboteur does not need to "remember" one particular ciphertext unlike the stateful attack presented by BPR neither does he need to collect as many as (at least) 896 ciphertexts, which is necessary in BPR's stateless attack [1] . Our attack requires the saboteur to have at most two to six ciphertexts to perform subversion sucessfully.
Preliminaries
In this section, we review several basic notions that will be used throughout this paper. First, we review the formal definitions of a symmetric encryption scheme, followed by pseudorandom function.
Definition 1: Let (G, E, D) be a symmetric encryption scheme. The key generation algorithm G takes 1 n (n denotes the security parameter) as input and outputs a key k. Taking a key k and a message m as input, the encryption algorithm generates a ciphertext c. We denote this operation by c ← E(k, m). Taking a key k, and a ciphertext as input, the decryption algorithm outputs a message pair m or ⊥ (reject symbol). We denote this operation by m ( or ⊥) ← D(k, c, s). 
, where the first probability is taken over uniform choice of k and the randomness used in D, and the second probability is taken over uniform choice of f from the set of all functions mapping n-bit strings to n-bit strings and the randomness used in D.
Now, we review the definition of a subverted symmetric encryption scheme [1] , which is based on the generic symmetric encryption scheme defined in Definition 1.
Definition 3: Let (G, E, D) be a symmetric encryption scheme. Let (G, E, D) be a subverted symmetric encryption scheme. The subversion key generation algorithm G takes 1 n (n denotes the security parameter) as input and outputs a subversion keyk. Taking a subversion keyk, a key k generated by G, a message m and a state σ as input, the encryption algorithm generates a subverted ciphertext c and a new state σ . We denote this operation by (c, σ ) ← E(k, k, m, σ). Taking a subversion keyk and a key k generated by G, a ciphertext c and a state σ as input, the decryption algorithm outputs a message/state pair (m, σ ) or ⊥ (reject). We denote this operation by (m,
Note that in the above definition, the subverted symmetric encryption scheme is defined as stateful in general, i.e., either of σ and σ is non-empty string. If both σ and σ are empty strings in both encryption and decryption algorithms, the scheme is stateless.
Intuitively, a basic security requirement for the subverted symmetric encryption scheme from the point of the saboteur would be that a ciphertext generated from the subverted scheme is not distinguishable from the one generated from the regular symmetric encryption scheme. The following definition called "undetectability" captures this intuition [1] . Definition 4: Let (G, E, D) be a subverted symmetric encryption scheme. Let A be an adversary. Consider the following game Detect A (n):
1. A uniform subversion keyk is generated by G. 2. A uniform bit b ∈ {0, 1} is chosen. 3. A is given oracle access to KEY(·) and Enc(·), which are described as follows.
• KEY(·): On input i, this oracle returns a uniform key k i generated by G. The subverted encryption scheme is said to be undetectable if there exists a negligible function (n) such that Pr[Detect A (n)] ≤ 1 2 + (n).
The Proposed Subverted Symmetric Encryption Scheme
We now describe our subverted symmetric encryption scheme (G, E, D), which is to conduct IV-replacement attack. Let (G, E, D) be a symmetric encryption scheme with security parameter n ∈ Z + . We assume that the scheme (G, E, D) is stateless and "surfaces" IV, meaning that IV is explicitly present as one of input parameters and there exists an algorithm S that efficiently recovers IV, i.e. S(E(k, m, IV)) = IV. Let E be an encryption algorithm of a block cipher whose key, input and output lengths are the same as n. We assume that |IV| = n for the sake of simplicity (as done in [1] ) and that j ∈ Z + ∪ {0} is a global counter, initialized to 0. We also assume that a state σ is initialized to NULL (a null string). The description of each sub-algorithms is as follows.
•
On input a subversion keyk and a key k of E, both of which are selected at random, a counter j, a message m and a state σ, E works as follows.
If j = 0 mod 2, do the following:
If j = 1 mod 2, do the following:
Set j ← j + 1 and σ ← ( j, τ).
• D(k, c l , c l+1 ) for some l ∈ Z + ∪ {0}: On input a subversion keyk, two consecutive ciphertexts c l and c l+1 , D recovers IV l and IV l+1 from c l and c l+1 respectively, computes ι ← E −1 (k, IV l+1 ) and k ← ι⊕IV l and outputs D(k, c l+1 ).
Note in the algorithm E that the j-th random IV j , where j = 0 mod 2, is XORed with the subversion keyk and is provided as input to the block cipher E. This procedure essentially randomizes E. Note also that while the underlying encryption scheme (G, E, D) is stateless, its subversion (G, E, D) is stateful. However, different from the stateful subverted scheme presented in [1] , our scheme does not require the saboteur to get one particular subverted ciphertext to recover the symmetric key k. (Obtaining the first subverted ciphertext can be difficult in practice due to an transmission error, delay, loss and etc.) Again, different from the stateless subverted symmetric scheme presented in [1] , ours does not require the saboteur to collect as many as 896 subverted ciphertexts, which is equivalent to the size of 128-bit symmetric key multiplied by the log value of it. In our subverted scheme, the saboteur needs only a small number of consecutive subverted ciphertexts to recover the key of the underlying symmetric scheme, as shown below.
Theorem 1:
Assume that pairs of consecutitve ciphertexts are selected at random by a saboteur. Then the decryption algorithm D will decrypt a ciphertext correctly with probability 1 − (1/2) t , where t denotes the number of pairs of ciphertexts.
Proof 1: For a given pair of consecutive subverted ciphertexts, depending on whether the first of them is j-th ciphertext such that j mod 2 = 0 or not, the saboteur can succeed in decrypting them. This happens with probability 1/2 assuming that a pair of ciphertexts is selected at random. When decryption fails, the saboteur picks another pair of consecutive ciphertexts at random independently and tries to decrypt them. This process continues until the saboteur decrypt a pair of ciphertexts correctly. Note that at each trial (of selecting a pair of ciphertexts), the saboteur's success probability follows geometric distribution. Hence, the probability that less than or equal to t trials (t ≥ 1) are necessary for the saboteur to succeed is (1 − 1/2) 0 (1/2)
Note that even for small t, the saboteur can successfully decrypt the pair of consecutive subverted ciphertexts and hence obtain the key for the scheme (G, E, D) with a high probability. Thus, we call our scheme "semi-stateful" meaning it is essentially stateful but it is quite close to stateless scheme, which only needs the small number of subverted ciphertexts to perform IV-replacement attack.
Security Analysis
In this section, we show that our subverted symmetric scheme presented in the previous section satisfies the undetectability property (Definition 4).
Theorem 2:
Assuming that the block cipher E is a pseudorandom function, our subverted symmetric encryption scheme is undetectable.
Proof 2:
Let A be an adversary of the undetectability game for the scheme (G, E, D). We construct an adversary D for pseudorandom function E(k, ·) that uses A as a subroutine as follows.
1. Choose a uniform key k i ∈ {0, 1} n . 2. Set j ← 0, τ ← ⊥ and σ ← ( j, τ). 
Concluding Remarks
Our result shows that subversion on symmetric encryption schemes with random IV can be performed very efficiently. Hence, care must be taken to implement and deploy such schemes as a form of software. It is imperative that proper verification and validation of this kind of software be conducted.
